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Dr Taylor C. Sherman 
 
The integration of the princely state of Hyderabad and the making of the 
postcolonial state in India, 1948-56 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the impact of the police action and the anti-communist struggle 
in Hyderabad on the formation of the Indian state in the first years after 
independence. Because of its central location and diverse cultural heritage, the 
absorption of the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union was an important 
goal for Nehru’s government. But the task of bringing Hyderabad into the Union was 
not an easy one. As it entered Hyderabad, the government of independent India had 
to come to terms with the limitations of the police, military and bureaucracy which it 
had inherited from the colonial state. As it took over the governance of the state, it 
had to find ways to manage relations between Hindus and Muslims, even as the 
social order was being transformed. And it had to fight communism in the Telangana 
region of the state, whilst trying to ensure the loyalty of its new citizens. This article 
examines the ways in which India’s first government confronted these complex 
problems. The following pages argue that these early years must be seen as a time 
of great dynamism, rather than as a period of stability inherited from the colonial 
state.  
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There is near consensus amongst scholars of postcolonial India that, at least in 
retrospect, the Nehruvian period was one of relative calm and stability. According to 
this line of thought, independence did herald change in India, including the 
introduction of democracy with universal suffrage and a constitution with a charter of 
fundamental rights, but the trauma of partition, the war over Kashmir and the 
integration of the princely states, ‘ensured that precisely those traits of the Raj which 
Indian nationalists had struggled against were now reinforced’.1 The police, military 
and bureaucracy inherited from the colonial regime, it is agreed, enabled the 
Congress-led government to ‘enforce central authority’, and to ensure stability in a 
unified Indian state.2   
 
The following pages challenge this view by examining the integration of the princely 
state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union. It is argued that this view posthumously 
invests the colonial state/early postcolonial state with qualities it did not have. The 
idea that the colonial state acted as a monolithic machine to stamp out dissent and 
disorder where it pleased is unsustainable. Central policy was often fraught with 
contradictions. Institutions, especially the police, courts and prisons, were often 
overwhelmed by the work thrust upon them during times of unrest. Tensions between 
the centre and local administrators frequently erupted, as officers used their position 
as ‘the man on the spot’ to act contrary to orders or to justify committing acts of 
violence against the subject population. Taken as a whole, therefore, the colonial 
state was often either weak and inefficient or extraordinarily violent and ineffective.3 
By taking the absorption of Hyderabad as a case study, this work examines the ways 
in which the new government coped with its inheritance.   
 
Hitherto, the story of the integration of the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian 
Union has been told from a number of relatively parochial perspectives. There have 
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been personal stories of hardship and bravery during the conflict;4 detailed analyses 
of the tortured negotiations between the Indian government, the Nizam of Hyderabad 
and the British;5 clinical accounts of the military operations;6 and histories of the 
communist Telangana movement in the territory.7 None of these accounts, however, 
have examined the impact of the integration of Hyderabad on the formation of the 
state in newly independent India.  
 
The absorption of Hyderabad provides an excellent study of the nature of the 
postcolonial Indian state for three reasons. First, Hyderabad had been part of the 
calculations of all-India political parties at least since the 1930s.8 The territory was 
therefore a vital part of the self-image of newly-independent India. Secondly, it was 
the Ministry of States, part of the central government in Delhi, which assumed overall 
responsibility for the integration of the former princely states. After the police action of 
September 1948, the Hyderabad regime was virtually disbanded. As a result, the 
new authorities had relative freedom to shape the new territory as they pleased. 
Finally, as Hyderabad was brought into the Union, police, military and members of 
the bureaucracy were drafted in from the rest of India to rebuild Hyderabad. One can 
therefore use the case of Hyderabad not only to try to understand the ‘mind’ of the 
central government, but to examine the extent to which policies designed by the 
centre were successfully implemented on the ground. 
 
When they assumed power in Hyderabad, the new Indian government faced an array 
of questions the answers to which would impact the shape and character of the new 
nation-state as a whole. These included, how to deal with the limitations of the 
military, police, and bureaucracy which they had inherited; how to frame the new 
constitution to protect the integrity of the country; how to manage relations between 
Hindus and Muslims, whether in the bureaucracy or in the population; and how to 
fight communism and ensure the loyalty of their new citizens. This article explores 
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these questions in three sections. First, it situates the princely state of Hyderabad at 
the geographic, economic and cultural heart of the sub-continent, and locates the 
territory in the vision of India imagined by the British and their Indian successors. 
Secondly, it analyses the ways in which the Indian authorities addressed the question 
of relations between Hindus and Muslims after the fall of the Muslim-led government 
of the Nizam of Hyderabad. Finally, it turns to the ways in which the Indian army, and 
then the civilian authorities, confronted the communist Telangana movement in the 
eastern part of the state. It is argued below that, in the years shortly after 
independence, India’s internal character had yet to be set in stone, and the 
experience of the integration of Hyderabad reflects the vibrancy and uncertainty of 
the early Nehruvian period. 
 
Hyderabad and the Indian Union 
 
The history of the awkward place of the princely states in the transfer of power 
negotiations is well known.9 On the eve of independence, several large states, 
including Hyderabad, had declined to join either India or Pakistan. Each state 
presented its own unique problems, but the Government of independent India 
believed that the accession of Hyderabad to the Indian Union was ineluctable. As 
early as June 1947, Nehru had warned he would ‘encourage rebellion in all states 
that go against us’.10 In the new Indian Government, the accession of the 
subcontinent’s second largest princely state was viewed as a foregone conclusion 
because Hyderabad could not be independent except in name, given its geographical 
position.11 Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India’s Home member and Minister for States 
remarked, ‘Hyderabad is, as it were, situated in India’s belly. How can the belly 
breathe if it is cut off from the main body?’12 In the summer of 1948, as India’s 
statesmen, especially Patel, began to hint of an invasion, the British encouraged 
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India to avoid using force, but repeatedly declined the Nizam’s requests to intervene 
on his behalf.13 
 
In the months preceding independence, however, Nizam Mir Osman Ali Khan 
Bahadur had refused to accede to either India or Pakistan. He attempted, instead, to 
manoeuvre his state towards independence, from where he could negotiate an 
alliance with India, rather than amalgamation into India.14 To avoid accession, the 
Nizam’s government had signed a Standstill Agreement with the Government of 
India. The accord provided that relations between the state and the Indian Union 
would remain for one year as they had been prior to independence. India would 
handle Hyderabad’s foreign affairs, but Indian Army troops stationed in 
Secunderabad would be removed. Soon after the agreement had been struck, 
however, each side began to accuse the other of violating its terms. The Nizam 
alleged that the Indian government was imposing an informal embargo by using its 
control over railways leading into the state to deny the territory vital goods, especially 
arms and medical supplies.15 India claimed that the government of Hyderabad was 
edging towards independence by divesting itself of its Indian securities, banning the 
Indian currency, halting the export of ground nuts, organising illegal gun-running from 
Pakistan, and inviting new recruits to its army and to its irregular forces, the 
Razakars. These moves were regarded in Delhi as part of a ‘comprehensive plan to 
break up the economic cohesion of India.’16  
 
The situation in Hyderabad in 1948 
 
While the Nizam attempted to manoeuvre himself towards independence, the internal 
situation in the territory was deteriorating. The state had been crippled by communist 
insurgents on the one hand, and forces loyal to the Nizam of Hyderabad on the other. 
To a limited extent, Congress volunteers engaged in satyagraha had contributed to 
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the internal disorder by disrupting courts, filling jails, and engaging in sabotage with 
the aim of convincing the Nizam to join the Indian Union. As stories of the conflict in 
the state spread in India, and refugees fled into the surrounding Indian provinces, the 
Government of India concluded that the unrest threatened to undermine peace in the 
whole of India.  
 
When, in 1947, the authorities in Hyderabad refused to accede to either dominion, 
many opposition parties in the state called for the Nizam to join the Indian Union. The 
Congress launched a satyagraha, and encouraged students to leave schools, and 
lawyers to boycott courts. More radical members of the Hyderabad State Congress 
planned acts of sabotage, organised raids against government property and 
communications, and authorised their members to take action in ‘self-defence’, with 
weapons if necessary. According to an Indian government note in March 1948, 'the 
educational institutions function no more, the law courts are barren and the 
commercial life is shattered.'17 As many as 21,000 congressmen were said to have 
been arrested.18 However, the Hyderabad State Congress Party was divided 
organisationally along regional lines, and ideologically between socialists and 
liberals; its impact on the internal situation in the state, therefore, was more limited 
than that of the communists.19  
 
The fight between the communists and forces loyal to the Nizam, by contrast, was 
characterised in the spring of 1948 as ‘a people's revolt on the one side and fascist 
orgy and anarchy on the other’.20 Its roots were in the insurgency begun in 1944-
1945 in the Nalgonda and Warangal districts, known as the Telangana area, in the 
east of the territory. Forces loyal to the Nizam of Hyderabad sought to repress this 
communist movement. These forces comprised of police and military as well as local 
members of the Razakars. The Razakars, headed by Kasim Razvi, were a 
paramilitary organisation comprised of volunteers who were said to be as 
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enthusiastic as they were undisciplined.21 Razvi and his volunteers were associated 
with the Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimein, a political party with considerable influence 
over the Nizam and dedicated to maintaining Muslim rule in Hyderabad.22 Both 
communists and forces loyal to the Nizam employed brutal measures to strike 
against their enemy and intimidate villagers into collaboration. According to a 
pamphlet that the Government of India had drawn up for public consumption, 
between 15 August 1947 and 13 September 1948, the communists had murdered 
2000 people, attacked 22 police outposts, destroyed village records, manhandled 
141 village officials, seized 230 guns, eight revolvers and one rifle, looted or 
destroyed paddy worth Rs70,000, robbed cash and jewellery worth Rs10,43,668, and 
destroyed 20 customs outposts.23 While the primary fight up until early 1948 had 
been between the communists and the Nizam’s forces, in May 1948, the Nizam and 
urban members of the communist party struck an improbable tactical alliance against 
a common enemy, the ‘bourgeois’ Indian Union. According to the agreement, which 
aimed to bolster the fight for the independence of Hyderabad, the Nizam amnestied 
communists from jails, cancelled outstanding arrest warrants and lifted the ban on 
the party.  
 
During the summer of 1948, the Razakars continued to seek out and eliminate the 
enemies of the regime.24 They targeted not only Hindus, but Muslims whose loyalty 
was in doubt.25 As it became clear that negotiations with the Indian Union were 
stalemated, they also courted confrontation with Indian forces. Their raids against 
trains and villages in Madras, the Central Provinces (CP) and Bombay raised panic in 
these provinces. In July, Razakars killed six Indian Army troops in an ambush near 
the Indian enclave of Nanaj. 26 Equally, there were allegations that Indian troops 
crossed Hyderabad’s borders as they gave chase to Razakars. The Government in 
Delhi concluded that the increasing influence and violence of these unruly volunteer 
paramilitaries proved that the Nizam had lost control over his own territory.  
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These battles threatened to spill into Union territory in more than one way. First, 
refugees fleeing the disorders escaped into Indian territory to form large camps in the 
provinces of Madras and Bombay. Some estimates put the number of refugees at 
40,000 in CP alone.27 Secondly, though the fault lines in the conflict did not run 
neatly along religious lines, the perceived ‘communal’ nature of the fighting 
threatened to revive Hindu-Muslim tensions in India.28  
 
The Nizam’s government tended to privilege a few thousand Muslims, leaving an 
underclass of poor Muslims. Nationalist Muslims in the State tended to oppose the 
Nizam, while, as far away as Delhi, the Socialist Party enrolled Muslim volunteers to 
agitate against the Nizam.29 At the same time, the Depressed Classes Association 
and Depressed Classes Conference in Hyderabad had joined hands with the Nizam 
in June 1947 to fight against incorporation into the Indian Union, because they 
believed accession would entail domination by caste Hindus.30  
 
The structure of rule in the state, however, where a predominantly-Muslim 
government and gentry held power over large numbers of disadvantaged, of whom 
the majority were Hindus, appeared to divide the population along religious lines. And 
some political parties took advantage of this. Since the war, the All-India Hindu 
Mahasabha had used this government structure to gather support for their 
organisation. In 1941 they began to keep a record of all, ‘tyrannous and political 
injustices and unfairness on the Hindus in all Provinces and particularly under Muslim 
administration and Muslim states.’31 Hyderabad was no exception.32 As the violence 
of the Nizam’s forces increased in Hyderabad, Hindu nationalists called on Muslims 
throughout India ‘to give proof of their loyalty to the Indian Union,‘ by opposing the 
Nizam’s regime.33 Clearly, the subtleties and complexities of the Hyderabad situation 
were being folded into all-India communal politics. The Government of India, 
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therefore, concluded that the unrest in Hyderabad threatened to destabilise ‘the 
communal situation in the whole of India’.34  
 
In the volatile international situation in South Asia in the year following independence, 
Nehru had been reluctant to use force to bring Hyderabad into the Indian Union.35 
The Indian economy was suffering a crisis of inflation, accompanied by a panic in the 
gold market, which impelled the Government of India to re-impose controls on textiles 
and other essential commodities. In addition, the autumn of 1948 was a tense time 
for the militaries on the subcontinent. Pakistan had admitted that its troops were 
present in Kashmir, and Nehru was writing of being at war with its neighbour, albeit 
an undeclared one.36 India feared that any move against Hyderabad would prompt a 
military response from Pakistan. Though Pakistan had no plans to protect Hyderabad 
with arms, India did not know this.37 Moreover, the new government in India was 
trying to calm tensions after the violence of partition, and struggling to provide for 
millions of refugees. The situation in Hyderabad, they concluded, must be resolved 
before it adversely affected India’s internal and international security.  
 
On 13 September 1948, therefore, the Government of India declared a state of 
emergency, and sent its troops into Hyderabad State. During the ‘police action’, the 
Indian Army entered Hyderabad with the objective of forcing the Nizam to re-install 
Indian troops in Secunderabad to allow them to restore order in the state. The Nizam 
surrendered in four days, and the Government of India appointed Major-General J.N. 
Chaudhuri as Military Governor. Delhi decided that the Nizam could retain his 
position as Rajpramukh, though law-making and enforcement power rested with the 
Military Governor.  
 
Hindu-Muslim relations and the character of the new Hyderabad State 
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Once they had seized control of the territory, the new Military Governor, Major 
General Chaudhuri, the Chief Civil Administrator, D.S. Bakhle, and the Government 
in Delhi had to ask themselves what character and composition they wished the new 
Hyderabad state to have. This question involved a number of different elements. 
First, to what extent would those who took part in violence before and during the 
police action be punished for their activities? Secondly, how far would the Muslim-
dominated administration in the state be altered? Finally, what role would the 
Congress Party have in the new state? Given that each of these questions impacted 
Hindu-Muslim relations, Nehru felt that the decisions which they made in Hyderabad 
would be seen as the touchstone of the Indian government’s minority policy.38  
 
Before the invasion of Hyderabad, Nehru’s primary concern was to normalise Hindu-
Muslim relations there and in the rest of the country. He wrote to Patel that, after the 
problem of the Razakars, all other issues were ‘relatively secondary’.39 Before the 
first Indian troop set foot in Hyderabad, there was much uncertainty over whether the 
police action would provoke an adverse reaction amongst Muslims in India. In the 
state’s surrounding provinces, therefore, provincial governments detained dozens of 
Muslims, including Members of the Legislative Assembly, for ‘security reasons’, on 
the grounds that their sympathies with Hyderabad might spur them into inciting 
unrest.40 As troops marched into the state, many Muslims in India lent their support 
to the police action, however.41 Prominent Muslims in Delhi publicly welcomed the 
Government of India’s choice to come to the aid of the ‘innocent masses’ threatened 
by the Razakars, and appealed for calm.42 In the event, there was no trouble in India 
during the five days of the police action. Indeed, before reports emerged of the 
fighting within the state, Nehru ventured to declare that Hyderabad had 'suddenly 
opened out a new picture of communal peace and harmony.'43  
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Quickly, however, stories began to seep out of large-scale violence within the 
territory in the immediate aftermath of the police action. It is unclear exactly what 
happened between the people of Hyderabad, the members of the falling regime, and 
the invading forces during and immediately after the police action, but it appears that 
there was widespread bloodshed as the population took the opportunity to commit 
acts of violence against the Razakars and other Muslims. Two prominent nationalists, 
Pandit Sunderlal and Qazi Abdulghaffar prepared a report on the situation after 
Nehru appointed them to tour the state and assess the extent of the destruction, but 
the original was suppressed and only scraps of it remain.44 They recorded that after 
13 September, there had been a widespread anti-Muslim purge, which had occurred 
primarily in the Marathwada and Telangana areas. What evidence is available 
suggests that Hindu residents as well as some members of the Army attacked 
persons and property in the weeks after the police action began.45 Conservative 
estimates suggest that 50,000 Muslims were killed.46 Others claim several hundred 
thousand died.47 Indian troops in some places remained aloof from these activities, in 
others, they were implicated in them.48 Sunderlal and Abdulghaffar concluded that, 
‘In general the attitude of the military officers was good but the soldiers showed 
bigotry and hatred.’49 The invasion of Hyderabad had not heralded a new era of 
communal harmony in the territory. Instead, the main task of the new authorities in 
the state was to cope with the aftermath of the turmoil. 
 
In order to depose the existing regime and to contain the unrest, the Government of 
India’s police and military authorities had detained Razakars, Hindu militants, 
communists and many others more loosely connected with the general upheaval. 
According to their own figures, the military and police detained over 13,000 Muslims, 
plus several hundred Arabs and Pathans, who were associated with the Razakars 
and the Nizam’s irregular forces. Another several thousand Hindus were jailed after 
having been implicated in the post-police action reprisals against Muslims. Many 
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communists were also detained. But it is clear that, with their limited knowledge of 
the local situation, the invading forces simply jailed thousands of suspects without 
real knowledge of their activities. The police and military were captive to local 
informants, who took advantage of the situation to have their political enemies 
imprisoned.50 Indeed, many of the difficulties which the colonial regime had faced 
when confronting large-scale communal unrest also affected the early postcolonial 
government: the police and military were disposed to make mass arrests in order to 
restore order, and to think about prosecution only after the event. But court cases 
often simply provided another arena for the conflict, and the government came under 
political pressure to release those detained.51 
 
Having imprisoned an estimated 17,550 people as they entered the territory, the 
Government of India was left with the questions of what to do with all the prisoners 
rounded up in the upheaval, and how to relieve the problem of over-crowded jails.52 
In Hyderabad, the Government of India inherited a criminal justice system which had 
been paralysed by the conflict, and could not process any significant number of 
cases. This meant that, just as in British India, politics came to determine who was 
subjected to formal punishment, and who escaped. Of course, many of the political 
aims of the Nehru government were different from those of the British: they were 
concerned not to spend money on expensive legal proceedings which could 
otherwise be used for development projects; and they were sensitive to the 
importance of political parties in a democratic age. For their part, many members of 
the public remained constant in their insistence that, when the government punished 
participants in communal violence, this only worsened relations between those 
communities who were perceived to be at loggerheads with one another.53 For these 
reasons, though thousands were originally detained, only a few exemplary persons 
remained in jail by 1953.  
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Given the volume of cases, the military regime decided to prosecute only those ‘who 
indulged in the worst kind of atrocities’.54 In the six months following the Nizam’s 
defeat, therefore, the government released over 11,000 Muslims without trial 
because no incriminating evidence against them existed. They also deported some 
2000 Arabs back to Aden and a similar number of Pathans to ‘other parts of India’.55 
Major-General Chaudhuri and his administration planned to prosecute the remainder 
of those detained. Accordingly, shortly after the proclamation of the State of 
Emergency, the Government of India propounded a Special Courts Order to 
dispense with the large numbers of persons in jail. In a word, the order was designed 
to process cases speedily. To this end, it relaxed the standards of written evidence 
by requiring only summaries of the evidence rather than full accounts; it made it 
impossible for an accused to deliberately delay proceedings, e.g. by hunger striking; 
and, at first, it provided for no right to appeal to higher courts. This latter provision 
was amended in October 1949, to allow appeals to the High Court for major offences. 
There was no mention either way as to access to a lawyer, and it appears that while 
some of the accused obtained counsel, others declined or were denied access to 
one.56 The ordinance strongly resembled those which had been passed by the 
colonial government during the twentieth century. For example, it incorporated the 
lessons which the British had learnt by making it impossible for a defendant to delay 
a case by hunger striking.57  
 
In reality, the Special Tribunals were anything but speedy. In each of the courts sat a 
three-member panel, all of whom had to be present for a case to proceed; when one 
member was sick or on leave, the tribunal did not meet. Further, English was the 
working language of the tribunals, but there were few advocates who were able to 
conduct a prosecution in English.58 As the trials made halting progress, thousands 
languished in jails waiting for the police to finish investigating their cases or for the 
courts to begin their trials.59  
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By April 1949, appeals for an amnesty were gaining volume. Thirteen Urdu 
newspapers jointly asked the government to free Muslims who had been imprisoned 
‘on mere suspicion’ and had yet to stand trial. The editors suggested that these men 
had suffered in jail long enough, and that their continued detention would serve no 
good purpose. To release them would help create a ‘harmonious atmosphere’ in the 
state, and it would foster the minority community’s confidence in the government.60 
Similarly, Swami Ramandanda Tirtha, leader of the Congress Party in the state, 
agreed that the institution of cases for events which had occurred nine months before 
was ‘causing great discontent’.61  
 
The constraints of governance in a democratic state had an impact in three rather 
contradictory ways on the decisions which the government made about these 
prisoners. First, as these men had been detained for several months without trial, the 
International Committee for the Red Cross was pressing Nehru to see that those 
detained were either prosecuted or released.62 Nehru had long since realised that the 
eyes of the world were on Hyderabad and wished to prove that the new Indian 
Government could be balanced in its approach to both Hindus and Muslims.63 
Secondly, it was the widely held opinion amongst the new rulers of the state that the 
communist and ‘communalist’ parties in the state remained popular because the 
state Congress Party was weak. Chaudhuri, therefore, hoped that the release of 
prisoners would ‘rehabilitate the prestige of the Hyderabad State Congress’ Party in 
the eyes of the public in Hyderabad, and improve relations between the state and 
national sections of the party.64 Even so, there could be no general amnesty because 
the Military Governor still wished to prosecute prominent Razakars such as Kasim 
Razvi.65  
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When the government of Hyderabad, in consultation with the centre, weighed these 
arguments, they knew that any policy adopted could not be seen to favour either 
Hindus or Muslims. The new government convinced itself that equal blame did attach 
to each community. In Major-General Chaudhuri’s words, ‘in political physics, 
Razakar action and Hindu reaction have been almost equal and opposite’.66 Thus, 
when it was decided to free all Hindus and to institute a programme for the review of 
Muslim cases with an aim to gradually letting many out of jail, the government 
preferred that the policy be given no publicity.67 Releases were staggered and former 
prisoners made to report periodically to the police.68  
 
Because prosecutions of either Hindus or Muslims in cases of ‘communal’ violence 
tended to elicit allegations of bias, any cases which were brought to court had to be 
designed to minimise ethnic tensions. Thus, Kasim Razvi and four of his associates 
were prosecuted for the alleged murder of a fellow Muslim, Shoebullah Khan. The 
victim, a nationalist journalist who had opposed the Razakars, was killed on 22 
August 1948. His murder attracted public interest, though only after the police action 
had begun. The Bombay Chronicle described the journalist as ‘a brave young man’ 
for refusing to bow to the will of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimein. The paper went on to 
declare Shoebullah ‘a martyr in the cause of the people.’69 Though a Special Tribunal 
found Razvi and his cohorts guilty, they were acquitted in the High Court. The same 
men stood accused in the Bibinaga Dacoity Case, which ran simultaneously with the 
Shoebullah Khan case. In the former, it was alleged that, when passing through 
Bibinaga station in a train, the accused had shouted 'Shah-e-Osman zindabad', but 
the people in the station had replied with the nationalist slogan ‘Mahatma Gandhi ki 
jai’. The accused then disembarked, and proceeded to burn down a house, and beat 
and rob those in the vicinity of the station.70 In this case, the High Court upheld the 
Special Tribunal’s guilty verdict, and the men were sentenced to imprisonment. It was 
believed that if this type of case were chosen then the prosecutions would be more 
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likely to inspire in the public feelings of pure abhorrence or deep nationalism, rather 
than enmity between Hindus and Muslims.  
  
As news of the convictions of Razvi and his men reached the public, prominent 
politicians again pressed Nehru to show generosity to the Muslims of Hyderabad.71 
The Prime Minister was sympathetic. Hyderabadi Muslims, he wrote to Patel, 
exemplified a unique ‘and rather attractive culture’, and were ‘very much above the 
average’.72 In essence, Nehru argued that Muslim prisoners in Hyderabad were not 
criminal types, and therefore did not merit punishment. Instead, their behaviour in the 
summer and autumn of 1948 was analogous to the ‘madness’ that seized ‘decent 
people’ in the country during partition. Many of those guilty of partition violence 
remained free in India and lived ‘as respected citizens.’73 By this logic, if the crimes of 
partition could be buried, so could those of Hyderabad’s accession. Nehru also 
warned that if a gesture of ‘friendliness’ were not offered ‘to those who are down and 
out and full of fear’ these disenfranchised Muslims could join forces with the 
communists. Finally, the Prime Minister argued, in a developing state the money 
spent on prosecution could have ‘brought rich results if spent on constructive 
activities in Hyderabad.’74 
 
When Nehru first voiced these arguments, Patel demurred. He was convinced that 
the promise of penal action against criminals had helped restore law and order, and 
that if that promise were not fulfilled, it would signal the government’s partiality for 
Muslims and would endanger the peace in the state.75 By the time the cases of 
Kasim Razvi and of the ex-ministers of the Nizam’s regime had wound their way 
through the judicial system, Patel had passed away and elections were about to be 
held under a much improved political atmosphere in the state. In January 1952, all 
ex-Ministers were released; only Kasim Razvi and a few members of the Nizam’s 
regime who had been involved in the most notorious cases remained in prison.76   
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In the end, only a handful of symbolic Razakars were punished with formal 
imprisonment. Just as its colonial predecessor had been, the Indian government 
faced administrative constraints which precluded the use of the ordinary judicial 
system to dispose of every case arising out of large scale violence. The police and 
military, lacking real intelligence or familiarity with the territory, jailed thousands 
without obvious cause, and without labouring to find one. Courts, even special 
tribunals, were unable to work through the cases at a reasonable speed. Pleas for 
amnesty inevitably arose in circumstances in which the members of the public 
believed that people were being detained unfairly for protracted periods. Political 
considerations, therefore, determined the futures of those who found themselves in 
jail.  
 
Intimately tied to these issues was the question of the Hindu-Muslim balance in the 
services. The well-known rivalry between Patel and Nehru was crucial in this respect, 
as Patel often ran the States Ministry without as much consultation with Nehru’s 
Cabinet as the Prime Minister would have preferred.77 Before the invasion, Nehru 
had presided over a meeting in which it was decided that, in order to be generous to 
the Nizam and to create a positive impression on the other princely states, the 
military regime ought to change as little as possible in Hyderabad. Dramatic 
administrative and policy changes in the territory were to wait for a democratically-
elected government.78 At other levels of administration, however, divergent ideas 
took hold. The new authorities in Hyderabad attempted to adjust the ethnic balance 
in the executive, police and administrative services, where Muslims predominated. 
To this end, they dismissed over a hundred officers, from the Chief Secretary to low-
level police personnel. 79 They also detained many of those local officers who were 
suspected of participating in the violence which accompanied the police action. In 
addition, they attempted to reduce the number of Muslims working in the civil service 
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or sitting as judges through forced retirement, or transfer from the state. They 
adopted a policy of not hiring new Muslims in the services. The civilian administration 
under Vellodi continued this policy.80 And the government introduced in June 1950 
under a scheme of diarchy had similar ideas.81  
 
To replace those dismissed, they drafted in junior officers from Bombay, CP and 
Madras. This created greater difficulties, however, as many of the new officers were 
not only inexperienced, but were also unable to speak the languages of the people 
under their jurisdiction, and were unfamiliar with local conditions.82 This left the 
administration generally, and the criminal justice system in particular, unable to 
function efficiently or effectively. The Prime Minister objected to these schemes on 
the grounds that they were both inspired by ‘communal’ chauvinism and impractical 
because they brought in incompetent outsiders.83 Nehru, along with many 
Hyderabadis, called for qualified Hyderabad residents to fill vacant posts. However, 
the people taking the reigns of power in Hyderabad were able to circumvent these 
orders by falsifying residency documents.84 Thus, the answers which were found to 
the question of the ethnic composition of the services were neither similar, nor co-
ordinated. It is clear that the new Indian government in Delhi, like its British 
predecessor, had to contend with competing visions of the state. These visions were 
not identical to those present before 1947, but they were a mark of the continued 
inability of the centre to elicit discipline and obedience from the individuals it 
employed. 
 
The Congress party in Hyderabad 
 
The final question facing the new authorities in Hyderabad was what the role of the 
Congress Party in the state ought to be. Initially, the answer seemed relatively 
straightforward to the government in Delhi. Congressmen at the head of the 
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Government of India wished the Hyderabad State Congress Party to guide the future 
of the state. To some extent this decision can be explained by the supposed 
ideological affinity between the local and the national party. Technically, the 
Hyderabad State Congress had not been part of the all-India party because 
affiliations with outside organisations had been banned under the Nizam. 
Hyderabad’s Swami Ramananda Tirtha, however, had participated in the non-
cooperation movement in Sholapur, and later made frequent visits to Gandhi. Tirtha 
often consulted him on matters of policy, though the two did not always agree.85 In 
addition, the all-India party had contributed to the Congress satyagraha in the state in 
1938.86 Moreover, the Hyderabad State Congress was also one of the few political 
organisations which was not confined to a single linguistic group, and which 
attempted to span the entire state. It would be easier to work with a single 
organisation rather than with the several linguistic parties.  
 
At the time, however, the Hyderabad State Congress had been in existence for little 
more than a decade, and had operated as no more than a token institution before 
1946. It suffered from organisational shallowness and internal divisions.87 If it were to 
take power successfully, the Hyderabad State Congress Party would need all the 
help it could get from the national party. To this end, when they took over the 
governance of the state, the Indian authorities ordered the release of all 
Congressmen who had landed in Hyderabad’s jails during their campaign of 
satyagraha and sabotage before the police action. Before the release, there was 
some debate as to whether those who had committed crimes of violence should be 
freed. In the event, Congressmen accused of violent crimes were let out, while 
communists were kept in jail, whether their crimes involved violence or not.88 Under 
these orders, the Government of India released 1222 out of 1736 detenus, and 7893 
out of 9218 political prisoners.89  
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The situation was far more fluid than had been anticipated, however. As the military 
and police attempted to restore order by arranging prosecutions against those who 
had partaken in the violence, many Congressmen ended up back in jail. The Military 
Governor reported that one faction in the party, ‘has given information against the 
members of the other groups for having been concerned in the commission of 
atrocities after police action.'90 It became clear that the fissures within the Hyderabad 
State Congress would not be easy to repair. Nehru met with Congressmen in the 
state to persuade them to bury their differences in the interests of their country.91 
V.P. Menon and Sardar Patel, repeatedly pressed the divergent blocs in the party to 
adopt a ‘united approach’, but their ‘bickering’ and ‘mud flinging’ continued 
unabated.92 Thus, though the Government of India originally had intended to 
establish a constituent assembly in Hyderabad, and to transfer power to a civilian 
government composed of Hyderabadis, within a few months of the police action, both 
objectives were soon shelved. The government in Delhi refused to hand power to 
democratically-elected representatives when the Hyderabad State Congress 
remained in ideological and organisational disarray.93 It therefore orchestrated a 
more gradual transfer of power, and did not sanction state-wide elections until 1952.  
 
If the state comprises not only policy, but institutions and individuals, it is difficult to 
draw a clear and simple picture of the Indian state during the first months after the 
police action because these three levels seem to be pulling in different directions. 
Policy coming from the Government of India level was clearly concerned to appear 
even-handed in its punishment of participants in the violence which surrounded the 
deposal of the Nizam’s regime. Nehru, at least, was also keen to avoid making 
drastic changes to state institutions. But as they took control of Hyderabad, the new 
Indian government found itself with poor institutions and independently-minded local 
officers. As a result, the composition of the administration in Hyderabad was changed 
significantly, and Muslims tended to be disenfranchised during this period. The 
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nature of politics in a democratic state also affected policy, for the centre’s decisions 
were designed to improve the stature of the Congress party, and to appeal to certain 
members of the electorate. But there were others who were not so easily pleased, 
and it is to the communists that we now turn.  
 
The communist insurgency and the making of the new state 
 
When they arrived in Hyderabad, the Indian military found that the communists had 
done great damage to the structures of government in the Telangana region, but that 
they had also introduced reforms on an impressive scale. The government, therefore, 
both fought the communists, and learned from them. Or rather, they fought them first, 
and then they learned from them. Their various encounters with the communists 
affected the future of India as a whole in many ways. This section will highlight two. 
First, some of the oppressive measures used against the movement came to be 
incorporated into the new nation’s constitution. Secondly, the development work of 
the communists encouraged the government to adopt its own programme of uplift for 
the peasantry. 
 
While the main justification the Government of India used as they entered Hyderabad 
was to end the ‘communal’ violence, they soon found that the problems in the state 
were intimately related to the communist uprising which was flourishing in the 
Telangana region of the state, for the violent struggle against the Nizam was centred 
in Telangana and led by communists. The communists drew adherents from a 
number of fronts. Amongst the poor peasantry and landless labourers, there was 
great resentment against the jagirdari system of landholding which governed 43 per 
cent of land in the state. This system was infamous for the high rate of forced labour 
extracted from peasants who held little land, were given paltry access to water and 
manure, and were subjected to high rates by (often absentee) landlords. Moreover, 
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during the Second World War, the burden of a compulsory levy fell heavily on the 
peasants who were experiencing similar agrarian troubles to those which plagued the 
rest of India. Rural areas also lacked facilities for medical care and education. These 
factors combined with a system in which customary class distinctions were often 
reinforced with brutal violence to leave a large number of peasants alienated from 
those who governed them.94 In addition, urban communists and wealthier peasants 
had initially fought their own battles under the communist banner, but by 1948, the 
coalition between poor and middling peasants had fallen apart.95 
 
In rural areas, the communist cause, led by Ravi Narayan Reddi and organised 
under the aegis of the Andhra Mahasabha, sought to alleviate the grievances of the 
poor peasants in the Telangana area.96 Though at the outset, they only targeted 
zamindars and deshmukhs, the police and military were pulled into the conflict at the 
request of local magnates, and by December 1945, the communists had launched a 
full-scale agitation against the state. Initially, they assaulted the prestige of 
government officials, especially the police. They progressed to boycotting local 
revenue collectors and judicial officials, and then to establishing their own 
panchayats and courts. Between July and November 1946, encounters between the 
communists and the Nizam’s forces grew increasingly violent, and in the last two 
months of that year, the Nizam’s police and military, with the occasional aid of local 
Razakars, undertook coordinated action against the communists. The Nizam’s 
forces’ tactics were varied. They cordoned off villages and captured suspected 
communists en masse, shot into crowds, burnt villages and engaged in widespread 
loot in a manner than that was described by one Congressman as ‘absolutely 
indiscriminate and organised.’97 Habeeb Mohammed, the subedar of Warangal, was 
later tried for crimes which included murder, and the burning of two hundred houses 
in the village of Gurtur. The taluqdar of Nalgonda, Moazzam Hussain, was said to 
have ordered the death of twenty ‘innocent Hindus’ after a group of several hundred 
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communists had attacked and killed several dozen Razakars.98 The communists 
responded with ‘punishment’ against government officials and suspected 
collaborators. Their measures were said to be more targeted but equally brutal.99 
Accounts of the action taken by both sides were documented by the Government of 
India, 100 by politicians such as Sarojini Naidu’s daughter, Padmaja Naidu,101 and 
they also appeared in the press.102 
 
When it became clear that the communists had not laid down their arms when the 
Indian Army arrived, the Military Governor adopted a policy of rooting out 
communists wherever they were found. Rhetoric was found to match. Nehru 
instructed Chaudhuri that the fighters in Telangana should not be referred to as 
communists, but as terrorists. The Prime Minister wrote, ‘too much talk of 
communists confuses the issue because communists in other countries function 
differently.’103 He made a distinction between communists in the Soviet Union and 
Indonesia who opposed imperialism, and those fighting the free government of 
independent India. To add factual support to this discourse, the Government of 
Hyderabad drew up a pamphlet entitled ‘Communist terrorism in Hyderabad’. The 
pamphlet’s message was simple:  
the Communist hooligans of Hyderabad have carried forward their 
campaign of crime to an extent that assures it a prominent place in 
any anthology of destruction.104 
Government forces, it was implied, had the right to use force to restore order, and to 
remove these outlaws from the territory. The means adopted to dislodge the 
communists were also heavy-handed. By December 1949, the police and military 
had jailed over 6000 persons without trial, and yet the ranks of communists seemed 
to be growing.105 
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Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution and the situation in Hyderabad  
 
Though these detentions did not have much effect on the communist movement, they 
did have a profound impact on the shape of the Indian Constitution, which was 
finalised during this crucial period in the country’s history. As the document was 
being drawn up by the Constituent Assembly, the sub-committee on Fundamental 
Rights was given the task of articulating the legal, political and social rights of the 
new citizens of the Republic of India.106 B.R. Ambedkar drew up a set of rules for 
arrest and detention which would suit India’s unique needs. After many revisions, the 
substance of Ambedkar’s final, multi-part article provided for very little protection 
against long-term detention without trial. It laid down rights for those arrested or 
detained, but then stated that these rights did not apply to those held under 
preventive detention laws which might be passed by the legislatures.107 Ambedkar 
justified the text on two grounds. First, India was in great turmoil: refugees, economic 
crisis, uncertainty over princely states and the rise of communism throughout the 
country justified the use of preventive detention. Secondly, it was not a ‘practical 
possibility’ to expect the current executive, judicial and administrative system to 
process and review large numbers of detentions, given the current political situation 
in the country.108 The infrastructure they had inherited was inadequate for the work at 
hand. If the constitution were to endow citizens with the right to have their cases 
reviewed in less than three months, as critics of the clause had suggested, then 
thousands would have to be released because courts and review boards would fail to 
meet the deadline.  
 
It would be easy to conclude that these measures signalled the willingness of the 
Government of India’s new leadership to anchor their power in the country by any 
means necessary. However, the articles adopted in the constitution must be seen in 
the context of the recent past in India. That most Congressmen had been detained 
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without trial for several years during the recent war affected the way that detention 
was viewed in the country. Imprisonment without trial was seen as a measure 
necessary in the face of grave danger. But the inveterate legalism of the leadership 
of the nationalist movement encouraged them to try to articulate in law the precise 
terms on which that power could be exercised. And yet, with knowledge of the 
weakness of the institutions which they had inherited, the constitution makers were 
unwilling to be tied down. The clause was the uneasy result of a compromise 
between legalism and pragmatism.   
 
Civilian administration and the victory of the generous 
 
Just as the constitution came into force, the political situation in Hyderabad began to 
take a new direction. In December 1949, the Military Governor’s administration 
ended, and M.K. Vellodi replaced Major-General Chaudhuri at the head of the new 
civilian administration in Hyderabad. Vellodi toured the Telangana districts and found 
that the authorities stationed in the area had not dealt with the communist cause ‘with 
any understanding’. He testified that, 'the villagers who had been alternately beaten 
up by the Military and the Police and the communists had a haunted look.’109 This 
section examines how the civil administration won the war with a combination of 
more responsive policing, and more aggressive programmes of development.  
 
Though the communists were branded ‘terrorists’ in public, the government quietly 
learned lessons from them. It was clear that the communists had earned the support 
of the people because they had tapped into grievances which the Indian government 
in the state had not begun to address. Assessing the achievements of the 
communists in the field of social and economic uplift, the Intelligence Bureau’s 
Deputy Director deemed them ‘positive and in some cases great.’110 The communists 
had redistributed land and livestock, reduced rates, ended forced labour and 
Taylor C. Sherman 
26 
increased wages by one hundred percent. They inoculated the population and built 
public latrines; they encouraged women’s organisations, discouraged sectarian 
sentiment and sought to abolish untouchability. ‘Thus’, concluded the Deputy 
Director, ‘the Communist regime was one of relief and uplift to the isolated villager 
and improved his self-respect.'111 
 
Members of the government in India were not ignorant of the significant influence of 
agrarian uplift on the political situation. Indeed, Nehru encouraged the Ministry of 
States to view the problems of the peasantry in Hyderabad in the context of the ‘great 
agrarian revolution …taking place over these vast areas of Asia’.112 In light of the 
communist uprisings in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia in 1948, it was obvious to the 
more discerning members of India’s governing class that the communist movement 
appealed to those in Telangana who suffered under conditions of socio-economic 
distress.113 Indeed, soon after the police action, Swami Ramananda Tirtha and his 
group in the State Congress cautioned Nehru that the use of force against 
communists would have to be supplemented with agrarian reforms in order to strike 
at the ‘root cause’ of the movement.114 
 
As the state’s first Chief Minister, Vellodi initiated a number of more nuanced military 
measures designed to disrupt the communist movement. He replaced the Brigadier 
in charge of the Telangana area, who spoke no Telugu, with Captain Nanjappa of the 
Indian Civil Service, who acted as Special Commissioner in the region.115 Review 
committees were constituted to consider the cases of prisoners who were elderly, 
infirm, or were no threat to security.116 Within a year over 5000 detenus were 
freed.117 Nanjappa substituted the sweeping and heavy-handed operations of the 
military with small police parties which worked on the basis of intelligence.118 Home 
guards and village patrols were organised to assist the police.119 In the beginning of 
1951, Nanjappa gave secret instructions to start a ‘whispering campaign’ to let it be 
Taylor C. Sherman 
27 
known that those who laid down their arms voluntarily would have their cases 
‘favourably considered.’120  
 
The authorities also began to build or repair infrastructure from roads and wells to 
dispensaries and schools. They passed a Tenancy Act, which was designed to 
improve the rights of tenants by capping landholdings, opening the market to 
cultivators, and protecting tenants from ejection.121 Although land reforms were not 
implemented in a uniform manner, and they did not go far enough in many areas, the 
Act went some way to recognising peasant grievances.122 A Tribal Reclamation 
Scheme was introduced in Warangal, under which two teams of Social Service 
Officers were constituted to ‘redress grievances and create contentment’ amongst 
the inhabitants of the area.123 To this end, they travelled through rural areas, and 
tried to settle any outstanding disputes, and alleviate all major difficulties in the lives 
of the villagers. These officers aimed to see that vacant government land was 
allotted, tenants’ rights confirmed, disputes with absentee landlords settled, land 
taken by moneylenders restored and debts reconciled. Having been allotted a lump 
sum of two lakhs, and an annual budget of 1.38 lakhs, they arranged for the supply of 
essential commodities such as cloth, kerosene and iron at subsidised prices.124 
Police and Revenue officials who visited tribal people distributed medicines, sold 
cheap cloth, and handed out free dhotis, sarees, soap, slates and books. As a result, 
noted the Deputy Central Intelligence officer with a hint of surprise, ‘their cooperation 
with the forces of law and order in this division is most spontaneous.’125 They were 
even helping to capture communists.126 
 
There are indications in the available documents, however, that these schemes were 
not without elements of coercion. The hill tribes in the area, the Koyas, Chenchus 
and Lambadas, were said to have had connections with the communists, who used 
them as couriers, and their settlements as hide-outs.127 In order to disrupt the 
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association between the two, the tribes ‘were uprooted from their villages inside the 
forests and made to live nearer to human habitation.’128 By February 1951, 7000 out 
of 30,000 Koyas in the Warangal area had been settled in villages under this 
scheme.129 It was widely reported that, because re-located tribes people lacked basic 
facilities such as drinking water, they and their livestock fell victim to hunger and 
disease.130    
 
Measures for the uplift or simple relocation of tribesmen and of the peasantry, 
whether forced or voluntary, seemed to have drawn many away from communist 
influence. As a result, the communists had difficulty securing food, water and 
ammunition from the population.131 Moreover, the Communist Party of India (CPI) 
was divided over whether to continue the violent struggle in Telangana, or to 
participate in the general elections due the following year.132 In Hyderabad, the 
movement split along the same lines. Raj Bahadur Goud, and Maqdoom Mohiuddin, 
members of the City Communist Party, as well as Ravi Narayan Reddi, a prominent 
leader of the Andhra Mahasabha came out of hiding to disassociate themselves from 
the violent movement. They were promptly arrested.133 After seeking guidance from 
Moscow and Beijing, the CPI and the Andhra Mahasabha called off the armed 
struggle in the state in mid-October 1951.134 Top-ranking communists visited the 
state to support the call for a turn to electioneering. Though the change in policy did 
not satisfy all members of the movement, it brought about a formal end to the 
Telangana struggle.135 In 1952, the various parties of the left in the state united to 
form the People’s Democratic Front to contest the forthcoming general elections.  
 
The fight against the communists can be divided into two phases, the first  executed 
by the military, the next orchestrated by the civilian administration. The military phase 
of the campaign bore remarkable resemblance to military action during the British 
period. Hampered by a dearth of intelligence, and blinkered by the over-riding 
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imperative to restore order, their over-bearing acts of oppression and indiscriminate 
punishments produced either bitter quiescence or unending antagonism in the 
subject population. The Indian government in Hyderabad came into its own when 
Vellodi took power at the head of a civilian administration. Vellodi and Nanjappa 
‘discovered’ that if they could slake the population’s thirst for basic goods, the 
government could win their loyalty as well. And, marking a crucial departure from the 
British period, they found the funds necessary to achieve this end.  
 
This can be seen as part of a larger, global shift both in the nature of governance 
more generally and in counter-insurgency tactics in particular. After the second world 
war, the nature of citizenship changed as the responsibility of the state for the social 
and economic welfare of its population was greatly expanded. At around the same 
time, the British, too, began combating the communist insurgency in Malaya with 
measures designed to ameliorate the economic conditions in the countryside.136 The 
leadership of the new Indian nation quickly grasped the notion that if they were to 
earn and retain the loyalty of the people of India, they would have to fulfil the 
promises of the nationalist movement and provide uplift for the common people. If 
they failed in this task, they risked losing the allegiance of villagers, peasantry and 
labourers to communists who promised the prosperity that the Congress party could 
not deliver. 
 
The end of Hyderabad 
 
Hyderabad’s fate, in the final account, was intimately connected with that of South 
India as a whole. Since independence, significant sections of the population had 
urged the Government of India to re-divide the provinces in India along linguistic 
lines. Hyderabad, situated in the centre of South India, and populated by four distinct 
linguistic groups, was elemental to this vision of India. Indeed, as the existence of 
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Hyderabad kept these groups from being unified with their linguistic brethren, it was 
seen by some as the ‘centre of gravity of the British Empire in India.’ 137 Socialists in 
the new nation detested the feudal conditions extant in the state, and believed that 
the system could only be abolished by dismembering every element of the Nizam’s 
regime.138 The disintegration of Hyderabad, in these views, was essential in order to 
establish real swaraj in India. 
 
Though he cautioned against repeating the sins of partition, Nehru conceded that, in 
principle, if there was ‘strong and widespread’ support for the re-drawing of India’s 
internal borders, then ‘a democratic government must ultimately submit to it.’139 In 
Hyderabad, politics had long moved along linguistic lines, and the major players, 
including the Andhra Mahasabha, and the faction of the Congress Party led by 
Swami Ramananda Tirtha, favoured the break-up of the state.140 The People's 
Democratic Front, the socialists and the Peasants and Workers Party participated in 
the campaign for the disintegration of the state as well.141 In addition, the 
incorporation of Hyderabad into the Indian Union had emphasised the importance of 
local officers who spoke the local language of the population. This realization, 
combined with the agitation for linguistic states, tipped the balance against the 
continued existence of Hyderabad. In 1953, the state of Andhra Pradesh was carved 
out of Madras. In 1956, the Telugu-speaking regions of Hyderabad, including 
Telangana, were joined with the new province. And Hyderabad’s Marathi speakers 
were eventually amalgamated into the new state of Maharashtra, and its Kannada 




In light of the experience of Hyderabad, how can one characterise the state in 
independent India? Though this article only concerns Hyderabad, the police military 
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and bureaucracy which form the basis of this analysis were drafted into the state 
from outside, and, though one must be cautious, it is possible to draw conclusions 
which range beyond the borders of the former princely state. It is clear that, while 
there were some continuities, there were also sharp differences between the colonial 
and postcolonial state. When the members of the new government took over the 
institutions left behind by the British, they inherited many of the constraints of the 
colonial system. Courts were easily overwhelmed by unrest; prisons continued to be 
used as holding cells, rather than as disciplinary institutions; the police and the 
military were often clumsy and heavy handed, especially in the first phase of the 
occupation; and local officers could not always be relied upon to implement the 
centre’s policies as directed. The colonial apparatus simply did not provide the 
stability and coherence which many scholars have presumed. 
 
The new Government of India was able to integrate Hyderabad into the Indian Union 
because it was innovative. These innovations were inspired as much by pragmatism 
as by democratic concerns and ideological change. Because the Congress Party was 
concerned to assert its influence over the voting population, members of the 
government tended to formulate policies to serve this end. Intimately connected with 
the democratic imperative was the new socialist ethos which influenced government 
policy. Whether inspired by the communists of Telangana, contemporary practices of 
counter-insurgency, or Nehruvian socialism, the postcolonial state was more directed 
towards the uplift of Indian villagers. It quickly learned that development programmes 
could be more effective than coercion in certain circumstances.  
 
Above all, the rulers of independent India were remarkably flexible, particularly during 
the first few years after 1947. In Delhi and in Hyderabad members of government 
were not, as a whole, intractably loyal to any single idea. They were willing to adapt 
their policies to changing facts on the ground. This means that they did not fight all 
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their battles in the same way: in Hyderabad development was an important element 
in their fight against communists; in other places, other tactics predominated. In 
Hyderabad, new styles of governance had to be developed precisely because 
postcolonial India did not possess the institutional framework necessary to fight 
communists using the oppressive powers of the colonial police, military and 
bureaucracy. If later governments were able to secure their tenure by using these 
institutions, they did so only after significant change. Indeed, the military changed 
structurally and doctrinally after 1947.142 And the ranks of the police and bureaucracy 
expanded remarkably.143 Historians must now turn our attention to these changes, 
and we must begin to view the Nehruvian era as a time of uncertainty, dynamism and 
even contest within the new Indian state. 
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